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Abstract
Recruitment is often delegated to senior employees. Delegated recruitment,
however, is vulnerable to moral hazard because senior employees may avoid
recruiting the best candidates who could  threaten their future seniority. We find
that seniors will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information
asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to the candidates’ ‘type’.
Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering ‘tenure’ or
guaranteed seniority to the senior employee is neither always desirable for the
owner nor necessary to ensure good recruitment.  If there is information
asymmetry  between the owner and the senior employee regarding additional
aspects of firm operations, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure may be
needed to ensure that the best candidate is selected. Offering tenure may then be
desirable for the owner.
JEL Classification: D23, D82, J41, L22.








Recruiting competent employees is of paramount importance to any busi-
ness …rm. As the …rm can rarely observe the ability of a job applicant, the
recruitment process is vulnerable to the well known problems of transaction
under asymmetric information. It is therefore not surprising to …nd that
many of the key models of asymmetric information - particularly those in-
volving signaling and screening - were originally framed in the context of
this problem (Spence, 1973).
In practice, …rms use a wide variety of methods to recruit new employees.
This ranges from specialized personnel or human resource divisions for large
business corporations to interviews conducted by line managers and owners
(Stewart and Knowles, 2000) or even informal ‘word of mouth’ referrals
from senior employees in case of small business …rms (Caroll, Marchington,
Earnshaw and Taylor, 1999).
An important feature common to many of these methods is the delega-
tion of the responsibility of recruitment by the owner to personnel depart-
ments, ‘line managers’, senior employees or specialized employment agents.
Presumably this is due to the better information or ability of such agents to
identify job applicants compared to the owners - i.e. partners or shareholders
in the …rm (Greenwald ,1986 Williamson,Wachter and Harris,1975)
Designing optimal contracts to delegate tasks to a privately informed
agent is one of the classic problems of mechanism design (Guesnerie and
La¤ont, 1979). The problem arises due to the divergence of interests be-
tween the principal and the agent. In the present context, senior employees
entrusted with recruitment may avoid hiring the best candidates who may
threaten their own position in the organizational hierarchy (Carmichael,
11988, Friebel and Raith, 2000).
In this paper we explicitly formulate the owner’s problem of choice be-
tween direct recruitment and delegation. In other words the owner must
decide whether to delegate to the senior (supervisory) personnel the task of
hiring new employees or take an active role herself - assuming that she is not
busy elsewhere’(Itoh, 1994) . In doing this, she has to trade o¤ the gains
from superior competence/information of the supervisor against losses from
opportunism on his part1.
Looked at this way, it might appear that our formulation is relevant only
in the context of reasonably small proprietorships or partnerships, since the
shareholders or the real owners in large and well diversi…ed corporations are
unlikely to have any say in the recruitment process. This, however, overlooks
the fact that many …rms in Asian, Latin American and other developing
countries are controlled by tightly knit ‘family business groups’(Ghemwat
and Khanna, 1998). Further, even in large US or European corporations,
individuals or small groups with sizable shareholding often wield enough
control for our analysis to be relevant.
Di¤erences in the organizational status of the (internal) recruiting agents
in ‘large’ and ‘small’ …rms often go hand in hand with di¤erences in the na-
ture of information asymmetry that are crucial in determining the choice
between direct recruitment and delegation. Speci…cally, personnel depart-
ments in large …rms are concerned mainly with hiring and are unlikely to
hold other ‘specialized business information’ relative to the owner(s). The
line manager or senior employee in a small business, on the other hand,
typically holds private information in other aspects of business in addition
1This is similar to the idea that transfer of real authority to the agent promotes agent’s
initiative (to acquire information) but results in a loss of control for the principal (Aghion
and Tirole, 1997).
2to his special knowledge regarding candidates. We …nd that the problem of
moral hazard - deliberately choosing bad candidates to ensure ones seniority
in the organizational hierarchy - appears on the latter scenario.
Our study is also connected to the literature on tenure (Carmichael,
1988) where it is assumed that (a) the current faculty in an university can
better evaluate new candidates than the university administration and (b)
there is some constraint on the number of faculty positions. It then turns
out that the current faculty must be assured of their jobs - through tenure -
in order to honestly evaluate the candidates In this paper our principal focus
is on the choice between direct recruitment and delegation. Hence, to start
with we assume that tenure is not an option - i.e. the owner cannot credibly
commit to preserving the seniority of the supervisory employee in order to
ensure that he doesn’t deliberately choose an incapable candidate. Later,
though, we examine whether it is worthwhile to provide the supervisor with
tenured contracts that assures his position and thereby removes any moral
hazard in the recruitment process.
We …nd that if the only information asymmetry between the owner and
the senior employee is the one regarding the ability of the potential candi-
dates, the latter never deliberately chooses an inferior candidate although
he has an incentive to conceal the candidate’s ability after recruitment. Un-
der these conditions the owner always prefers to delegate recruitment to the
senior employee. However, this also means that tenured contracts are not
necessary to mitigate moral hazard on the part of the senior employee. In
fact, we …nd that untenured short term contracts may often be preferable
to tenured contracts under these circumstances.
On the other hand, if there is an additional information asymmetry
regarding some periodwise independent decision parameter, then there is a
3scope for second period ‘information rents’ that act as an incentive to retain
seniority by deliberately choosing an inferior candidate. The owner may
then prefer to recruit directly (i.e., by herself) in the absence of the ‘tenure’
option. If she can o¤er tenure, however, delegation will always do better
than direct recruitment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes case of asymmetric
information in a single dimension, i.e., the ability of the candidate. Sections
3 considers the case of additional asymmetry in information. Section 4
brie‡y considers tenure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Information Asymmetry in candidates’ ability
2.1 Model
In the formal model we have one principal - the proprietor, partner or the
‘controlling group’ and one agent - the senior employee, experienced line
manager or the ‘human resource department. There is exactly one vacancy
and two applicants for the post - although this last feature may be easily
generalized. We start with the setting where the senior employee’s private
information regarding the candidate’s ability is the only source of informa-
tion asymmetry between him and the owner. The model makes the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1: Supervisors/ managers have a greater impact on pro-
ductivity than lower level workers.
As already indicated, this is because managers are usually entrusted with
the independent responsibility of making critical decisions that a¤ect …rm
pro…tability or …rm value while ordinary workers/laborers are usually rele-
gated to performing routine tasks. Thus, the owner prefers more productive
people at the managerial positions [see Milgrom and Roberts (1994)].
4Thus, we assume the production function of the …rm in period t to be:
Yt = mt(et +lt) (1)
where Yt is the output of the …rm in period t, mtand lt are the abilities of
the manager and ordinary worker/laborer in period t respectively, et (> 1)
is the e¤ort of the manager in period t: The absence of a e¤ort term for the
laborer indicates the routine nature of the job where only the basic ability
contributes to the productivity of the …rm while for the manager the e¤ort
also matters.
Assumption 2 We assume, for the sake of simplicity that potential
candidates are of two types : ‘bad types’ with ability nB occuring with
probability p and ‘good types’ with ability nG > nB occuring with proba-
bility (1 ¡ p). At the time of recruitment, the senior employee is assumed
to observe the type of the two available candidates while the owner only
knows the probability distribution referred to above.This is likely to be true
where the senior employee - who is also the supervisor/manager in period 1
– is more informed or more involved in the operational activities of the …rm
or has superior professional competence.The competence of the senior em-
ployee, s, on the other hand, is assumed to be common knowledge.Further,
we assume that :
nG > s > nB (2)
so that the ability of the senior employee is lower than the good type candi-
date but higher than the bad type. Hence, in terms of our framework, if the
owner learns that the new employee is ‘good’ (or at least if the ‘expected
type’ is > s) she would promote her to the supervisory/managerial position.
5We assume that the senior employee is not …red but relegated to the position
of the ordinary worker.
Assumption 3: There are bene…ts attached to managerial positions
that motivates employees to strive for/retain such positions.In our model,
this is the result of greater discretion in managerial positions that entitle the
supervisor/managers to information rents in arising out of private informa-
tion. In particular, it is assumed that the utility function of the employees
is
Ut = U(wt;et) = wt ¡ V (et) = wt ¡ e2
t (3)
Thus, the utility function of the employees are separable in income
(wages) and e¤ort. It is assumed that the opportunity costs of employees
are independent of their abilities. For those working as laborers, therefore,
we simply have w¤
j = 0. Further, under perfect information, the wages of the
managers/supervisors exactly compensates for their e¤ort, e¤, which is op-
timally chosen by the owner, i.e., w¤
s = e¤2: Thus, under perfect information
there is no reason for the employee to strive for promotion to managerial
positions. However, the situation changes once we introduce asymmetric
information and the manager has to be given information rent to prevent
opportunistic behaviour. This implies that ws¤ > e¤2so that mangerial po-
sitions become desirable.
The time structure of the game is as follows:
Fig 1: Time Structure - private information on ‘type’ of recruit
In this structure, the the senior may retain his seniority either by de-
liberately choosing a ‘bad’ candidate when a good one is available or by
6concealing the true type of the candidate. It is therefore important to look
at the expected pro…ts of the owner not only under the usual (second - best)
separating contract but also the pooling contract - since there are now ad-
ditional incentives on the part of the senior employee to conceal the type of
the candidate - aside from obtaining immediate information rents..
Consider 1 period post recruitment pro…ts of the employer. Let b ¦(¯)
and ¦(¯) be the one period expected pro…ts of the owner respectively under
contracts that are separating and pooling in the candidate type that is pri-
vately known to the owner. This is clearly a function of ¯, the probability
that the candidate has a ‘bad’ type - a factor that depends on the mode of









b ¦(¯) > ¦(¯) (5)
Part (i) simply states that higher the probability that the recruited can-
didate has a ‘bad’ type, lower are the expected one period pro…ts of the
owner under a separating contract, although under a pooling contract the
one period expected pro…t is not sensitive to the distribution of types. Intu-
itively, the only pooling contract acceptable to both types in this framework
is one that gives zero pro…t to the‘bad’ type. Since this is the only contract
that is o¤ered (and accepted by the senior) irrespective of the actual type
of the recruit, the output and payment of the owner and hence her expected
pro…ts are always the same. In a separating contract the owner obtains a
higher ouput and pro…ts despite paying information rents when the senior
7‘reveals’ the candidate to be ‘good’, hence her expected pro…ts are a de-
creasing function of ¯: Part (ii) implies that this higher pro…t obtained in a
separate contract in case the candidate is good also accounts for the owner’s
pro…t to be higher than in a pooling contract.
2.2 Dynamic Contracts without commitment
Suppose now that the owner cannot credibly commit to the senior employee
that he will not be superceded if the new recruit is found to be more com-
petent than he is.Thus if the senior employee honestly chooses the best
available candidate and exerts the corresponding level of e¤ort in period 1
then it is quite likely that he may be superceded. This leads to a clear in-
centive to conceal the candidate’s type by lowering his own (unobservable)
e¤ort.
The literature on dynamic adverse selection models [La¤ont and Tirole
(1987,1988)] considers situations when the types are perfectly correlated
accross periods and it is not possible for the principal to commit not to take
advantage of the information revealed in the …rst period game. In this case
(provided @ is high enough) a separating contract in the …rst period is not
feasible since the good type would demand additional rents to compensate
for their lost information rents in period 2. It is shown then the optimal
solution in that case is the static pooling contract in period 1 followed by
the static separating contract in period 2.2
The …rst point is that in such a contract, the senior employee can make
any information rents at all only if he has chosen a ‘good’ candidate. With
2For this result, see Proposition 2 in La¤ont and Tirole (1987).The intuition is that
for a large ± the agent is more sensitive to the loss of second period information rents due
to …rst period revelation. To induce him to reveal him in period 1 is very costly and a
pooling contract is prefereable.
8a ‘bad’ candidate he earns no information rent in either period. Hence we
have:
Lemma 2: When the only asymmetric information is regarding the
type of the candidate there does not exist any moral hazard, i.e., the se-
nior employee never deliberately chooses a bad candidate when a good one is
available.
The second important issue is that, unlike the standard La¤ont Tirole
model, a pooling contract in period 1 leads to the replacement of the senior
employee if the expected type of the new recruit is better than the candidate,
i.e., E(n) > s. This is particularly important in the case of delegation since
the senior’s preference for a good type (if at least one is available) implies
that the expected type of candidate improves following recruitment. The
senior employee then loses nothing by accepting a separating contract in the
…rst period itself.
Proposition 1 If the only asymmetric information is about the candidate
type the optimal contract is:
1. pooling in the …rst period if the expected post-recruitment type of the
recruit is worse than the senior employee E(n) < s and the senior
employee always retains his seniority.
2. Otherwise, ie, if E(n) > s; the …rst period contract is separating
and the senior employee loses his seniority if the new candidate turns
out to be more e¢cient.The period 2 contract is fully separating.
3. Further, the owner always prefers to delegate recruitment.
Proof: Check that under direct(owner) recruitment, the probability
that the candidate chosen is bad (resp. good) will be p (resp:(1¡p)), since
9the owner cannot observe the type of the candidate. In other words ¯ = p.
Under delegation, the senior employee obtains an information rent only if
the employee is ‘good’ and chooses a ‘good’ one whenever available. He
chooses a bad candidate only when both are bad, i.e., ¯ = p2:Otherwise,
i.e., with probability 1 ¡ p2, he chooses a good candidate.
Thus, when the owner carries out recruitment, the expected post re-
cruitment type of the candidate is E(n) = n = pnB + (1 ¡ p)nG: Hence, if
s ¸ n, a pooling equilibrium in period 1 would lead to the senior employee
retaining his position. This is exactly similar to the situation in La¤ont
and Tirole (1987). Consequently if the owner o¤ers (a pair of) short term
contracts, it would consist of the optimal static pooling contract in period 1
and the optimal separating contract in period 2. However, if s · n;a pooling
contract in period one would lead to the senior losing his job at the end of
the …rst period as the expected type of the new recruit is higher than his
own. In this case, therefore he has no reason to reject the optimal separating
contract if it is o¤ered by the owner in period 1(which gives him at least the
information rent that he would get by concealing his type).
Now consider delegation.Here, since in the absence of moral hazard
(lemma ), the senior employee always chooses a good candidate (if avail-
able) the expected type of the candidate is e n = p2nB +(1¡p2)nG > n: This
means the likelyhood that the expected type of the candidate is greater than
the senior employee is even higher - an event clearly more attractive to the
owner.
Comparing the direct and delegated contracts we …nd that, when s >
e n > n, so that the period 1 contract is a pooling contract clearly¦(p2) +
@b ¦(p2) > ¦(p) + @b ¦(p) and delegation is always superior. Second when
e n > n > s; b ¦(p2) + @¦¤ > b ¦(p) + @¦¤ and again delegation dominates
10direct recruitment. Finally, check that when e n > s > n; b ¦(p2) + @¦¤ >
¦(p) + @b ¦(p): {
3 Additional Asymmetry in Information
A typical feature of small …rms is that the senior employee who acts as the
manager in period 1 often has responsibilities other than recruitment. The
senior employee or even ‘line managers’ in small and medium enterprises
may be involved in input purchase and product pricing or marketing deci-
sions or even investment and …nancial decisions. Clearly, accurate decision
making in these areas may involve access to private information regarding
various aspects of …rm activities - input and output price movements, ma-
terial inventories, purchase orders, state of machinery and equipment etc.
And these often entitle him to information rents in addition to those related
to the cadidate ‘type’. This is, of course, much less true of the ‘human re-
source manager’ in the large and diversi…ed corporation who is concerned
exclusively with recruitment and other aspects of employee welfare.
We shall assume (1) that the manager’s access to this additional level of
private information is characterized by his observation of the true realization
of a periodwise uncorrelated random parameter zt in each period, (2) this
realization of zt is not in any way correlated to the ability of the recruit
n.Thus, we assume the production function of the …rm in period t to be :
Yt = mt(et + lt + zt) (6)
where zt is the realization of the random parameter in period t. We
assume that in any period t, zt may take a value L (low) with probability
q or H(high) with the complementary probability 1¡q. The modi…ed time
structure of the game is as follows:
11Figure 2: Time Structure with additional asymmetry
As before, the senior may retain his seniority either by deliberately choos-
ing a ‘bad’ candidate or by concealing the candidate’s type . Note however,
that the senior employee now has private information regarding both n and
z:3 The di¤erences between these two dimensions of information asymmetry
are that (i) while n, the candidate type, once chosen, remains unaltered
across periods, zt is a periodwise independent random parameter that is
known only at the beginning of period t. (ii) while senior employee has in-
centives to conceal zt just to earn (period speci…c) information rents, he has
additional incentives to conceal n to retain his own seniority . So, in this
case, we will need look at the expected pro…ts of the owner not only under
the second best contract fully separating in n and z contract along with the
pooling-cum-separating contract -that is pooling in n but separating in z:
Thus let b b ¦(¯) and¦(¯) be the one period expected (post recruitment)
pro…ts of the owner respectively under fully separating and the pooling-cum-
separating contracts - which as before are dependent on ¯, the probability









b b ¦(¯) > ¦(¯) (8)
3In general, multidimensional contract menus are quite complex (see for example Arm-
strong and Rochet, 1999). They are, however, relatively simpler in our case because the
relevant parameters,n and z; are completely independent of each other.
12The interpretation is similar to Lemma 1. The probability that the
candidate has ‘bad’ type does not a¤ect the expected one period pro…ts of
the owner if the contract is pooling in type (pooling separating contract) but
a¤ects it (adversely) if it is separating in type (fully separating contract).
Part (ii) implies that the owner’s pro…t in a fully separating contract is
higher than in a pooling-separating contract.
3.1 Dynamic Contracts: Moral Hazard in Recruitment
In this setting, the senior employee can earn information rents from his
private information regarding z in addition to the information rents on type.
By deliberately choosing a bad candidate, he loses his current information
rents on n but may retain his senior position that entitles him to positive
information rents on z in period 2. This, then, introduces the possibility
of moral hazard on the part of the senior employee regarding recruitment,
i.e.,of deliberately choosing a ‘bad’ candidate when a ‘good’ one is available.
Speci…cally, we have:
Proposition 2 When there exists asymmetric information regarding both
the candidate type and the periodwise independent random parameter:
1. T he owner o¤ers a pooling - separating contract in period 1 if
s > n = pnB + (1 ¡ p)nG when she recruits directly or if s > ¡ ! n
= p2nB +(1¡p2)nG when she delegates. The senior chooses the best
available candidate and always retains his position. If s > ¡ ! n > n ,
then delegation is preferred
132. By contrast, if s < n under direct recruitment or if s < n ¡ ! under
delegation she o¤ers a fully separating contract in period 1 and the
more capable employee is put in charge in period 2. The senior chooses
the best available candidate. If s < n ¡ ! < n , then delegation is
preferred.
3. Finally, if ¡ ! n > s > n ¡ ! there may exist moral hazard under direct
recruitment in the sense that the senior deliberately chooses a bad
candidate when a good one is available. Direct recruitment then
may be preferred by the owner to delegation.
Proof: Under direct recruitment the question of moral hazard in re-
cruitment clearly does not arise. The expected type of the candidate is
n = pnB +(1¡p)nG. If the type of the senior employee is higher , or s ¸ n,
then by underreporting the ‘type’ of a ‘good’ recruit (by reducing his own
e¤ort ) he retains his seniority and obtains positive expected rents in period
1. Thus the period 1 equilibrium in this case is ‘pooling-separating’ and the
senior employee retains his position. The period 2 equilibrium is of course
fully separating.
For a similar equilibrium to hold under delegation, the senior’s type must
be higher than the (owner’s) expected type of the recruit when the senior
himself chooses a ‘good’ candidate if at least one is available , s > ¡ ! n =
p2nB+(1¡p2)nG > n. Only then does the owner retain the senior following a
period 1 pooling-separating equilibrium. When this last condition is satis…ed
therefore, there is a ‘pooling-separating’ equilibrium in period 1 and a
fully separating equilibrium in period 2 under both direct and delegated
recruitment.Delegation is preferred because a ‘good’ recruit is selected with
a higher probability and this positively a¤ects the second period (but not








d¯ = 0 + (0 <) < 0
where
z}|{
¦ is de…ned as the aggregate (two period) pro…ts when s > ¡ ! n
.
However, if s < n;under direct recruitment the senior would be replaced
in a pooling equilibium, so that he has no ”future incentives” to undereport
the type of the new recruit over and above that of obtaining the standard
period 1 information rents. The period 1 equilibrium is then fully separat-
ing leading to the repacement of the senior employee when the recruit is
‘good’.The same happens under delegation if the senior’s ability is so low
that he would be replaced after a ‘pooling - separating equilibrium in pe-
riod 1 even if he did choose a ’bad’ candidate whenever available, i.e., if
s < n ¡ ! = p(2 ¡ p)nB + (1 ¡ p)2nG < n: Choosing a ‘bad’ recruit inten-
tionally therefore makes no sense for the senior in this case. As before, the
fact that the senior chooses a good candidate whenever at least one is avail-
able means that under delegation the candidate is more likely to be good








d¯ +¦2(s;nB)¡¦2(nG;s)g < 0
where e ¦ is the aggregate (two period pro…t) when s < n ¡ ! and ¦2(s;nB)
and ¦2(nG;s) are the second period pro…ts of the owner with the senior
employee and the new recruit in the supervisory position respectively.
Finally suppose that ¡ ! n = p2nB + (1 ¡ p2)nG > s ¸ n ¡ ! = p(2 ¡ p)nB +
(1¡p)2nG: Here if the senior chose the good candidate whenever available,
the expected type of the candidate would be higher than his own so that
he is replaced in a period 1 ‘pooling-separating equilibrium’. Under these
circumstances the only information rent that the senior can possibly claim
are its period 1 rents with regard to”type n” and ”realization z”.There are
no ”future bene…ts” from concealing type and the owner would like to o¤er a
15”fully separating equilibrium”. If, instead, he chose a ‘bad’ candidate when-
ever available, his own type is higher than the candidate so that he retains
his position earning positive (expected) rents from his private information
on z in both periods. If the latter rents are larger, i.e.,
qR1GL + (1 ¡ q)R1GH < (1 ¡ q)R1BL + ±(1 ¡ q)R1BH
(where Rtij = wtij ¡ (et(ni;zj))
2 is the information rent of thr senior
employee in period t=1,2 and the candidate’s type and the realized value of
the additional parameter are ni and zj respectively) the senior employee
will clearly choose a ‘bad’ candidate as long as one is available and a ‘fully
separating’ equilibrium in period 1 cannot be sustained. The owner then
makes a ‘pooling-separating’ contract in period 1 followed by a fully separat-
ing contract in period 2. The senior chooses a bad recruit whenever at least
one is available and retains his seniority at the end of period 1. The likely-
hood that the candidate is ‘bad’ is higher under delegation, p(2 ¡ p) > p;
means that for ¡ ! n > s > n when the equilibrium is ‘pooling-separating’
in period 1 and ‘fully separating’ in period 2 under both systems, direct
recruitment is preferred, since d
z}|{
¦
d¯ < 0: When n > s > n ¡ ! direct re-
cruitment is even more preferred by the owner. This is because while the
delegation equilibrium remains unaltered the …rst period equilibrium under
direct recruitment is now ‘fully separating’. {
4 Tenure - Long Term Contracts
Carmichael (1988) investigates the question: ”Why are less productive older
professors not replaced by promising young candidates”. He …nds that
”....tenure is necessary because without it incumbents would never be willing
to hire people who might turn out to be better themselves”. Although later
16work (Chatterjee and Marshall, 2001) seems to argue that nonveri…ability
of (academic) output and provision incentives to invest in specialised aca-
demic …elds have been more important considerations in introducing aca-
demic tenure, its role in ensuring quality in academic recruitment must
surely have been signi…cant.
In this section we intend to investigate the consequences of tenure -
which in our context means assuning the manegerial/supervisory position
to the senior employee in period 2 even if the new recruit is found to be more
capable. We examine whether (1) ‘tenured’ contracts are always preferred by
the principle to untenured contracts, and (2) speci…cally, whether delegating
recruitment accompanied by tenure can do better than direct recruitment
when moral hazard is present.
Note that while long term contracts usually do better than short term
contracts in similar Principal-Agent models, the way ‘tenure’ is modelled is
not a fully long term contract in the proper sense. This is because in our
model we do not think of the Principal’s contract o¤er being conditional on
the type of the recruit. An important justi…cation for this may be that the
‘type’ or ‘ability’ of the recruit - while observable to the senior employee and
eventually to the owner from her observation of period 1 output - may not
be veri…able by third parties.
Proposition 3 When the only asymmetric information is regarding the type
of the candidate and the senior employee can commit to a long term contract
or tenure for the senior employee:
1. The tenured (long term) contract is a two period replica of the one
period separating contract.
172. when the senior has a higher type than expected post recruitment type of
the candidates under both systems , i.e., s > e n(where as in Proposition
1 e n = p2nB +(1¡p2)nG) the owner delegates recruitment along
with an o¤ers of tenure to the senior.
3. However, if e n > s recruitment will be delegated without the ac-
companying tenure o¤er.
Proof: First, observe that in the case of perfectly correlated types, the
solution to a long-term (multiperiod) contract is just the replication of the
one-period contract [Baron and Besanko(1984,1987), Baron(1989)].
Check from equation (..) above that in the case of the static optimal
separating contract the pro…ts of the owner are decreasing in the probability
of the bad type, ie
db ¦(¯)
d¯ < 0. Since the long term contract is simply a
replica of the one period contract, it is obvious that
d(1+@)b ¦(¯)
d¯ < 0: Finally
since the probability of the bad type is higher under direct than delegated
recruitment 1 > p > p2, delegation of recruitment is clearly preferable.
Recall also (Proposition 1) that delegation is always preferable when the
short term (untenured) contract is the only option. One consequence is
that (in the absence of moral hazard) the expected type of the recruit is e n
=p2nB + (1 ¡p2)nG
When s > e n; observe that the untenured contract yields the owner
¦(p2) + @b ¦(p2) as the senior always chooses the good candidate and the
…rst period equilibrium is pooling.This is clearly lower than the(1+ @)b ¦(p2)
that the owner gets under delegation with tenure. When e n > s , on the other
hand, the …rst period equilibrium for the untenured contract is separating
and yields b ¦(p2) +¦¤(p2) which is always greater than(1+ @)b ¦(p2) so that
the owner would never o¤er tenure. {
18Clearly, as there is no moral hazard in recruitment in this case, tenure
is not required to mitigate the problem associated with delegation. How-
ever, tenure may still be sometimes preferred by the owner to induce the
senior employee to reveal the type of his new recruit in period 1 so that
the owner may obtain appropriate bene…ts of this capability. By contrast,
with asymmetric information regarding both n and z, Proposition (2) shows
that there may be moral hazard in recruitment. The following proposition
con…rms that such moral hazard can be mitigated by o¤ering tenure to the
senior employee.
Proposition 4 When there is asymmetric information regarding both the
candidate type and the periodwise independent random parameter and the
owner can commit to tenure for the senior employee:
1. The period 1 component of the tenured (long term) contract is the one
period fully separating contract while the period 2 component is
conditional on the realized value of z and thus separating only in
type.
2. if the senior’s type is higher than the expected type of the best available
candidate, i.e., s > ¡ ! n = p2nB + (1 ¡ p2)nG) the owner delegates
recruitment with an o¤er of tenure to the senior.
3. if the senior’s type is lower than the expected type of the worst available
candidate, i.e., s < n ¡ ! = p(2 ¡ p)nB + (1 ¡ p)2nG recruitment will be
delegated without the tenure o¤er.
4. Finally if ¡ ! n > s > n ¡ ! the owner will prefer to delegate recruitment
along with an o¤er of tenure.
19Proof: It is well known (Baron and Besanko,1984) that the long term
contract is a 2 period replica of the one period (second best) contract when
the ‘type’ is perfectly correlated. If z is periodwise independent the period
1 contract continues to be the same while period 2 conract is just the …rst
best contract . As the senior does not know realized value of z in period
2 at the time of contracting, he cannot obtain any information rents on its
account.
In case of s > ¡ ! n , clearly the best available candidate is selected and the
senior retains his position under delegation whether or not there is tenure.
However, under a pooling -separating contract with tenure in period 1, the
e¤ort of the senior with the good candidate will be suboptimal unlike in
the fully separating …rst period contact with tenure. Further, in period 2,
the tenured contract involves information rents only on ‘type’ while in the
untenured version there are rents on z as well. Thus the tenured contract is
preferable.
When s < n ¡ !;again with delegation with or without tenure the best
available candidate is selected (because even by choosing the worst the senior
cannot retain his seniority). However under tenure the senior retains his
position while without tenure the best available candidate obtains seniority
in period 2. Futher, while the period 1 contract is fully separating (and
therefore equivalent) under both systems, the period 2 contract with tenure
permits information rents with respect to type (but not z); by contrast
the one without tenure permits information rents with respect to z (but
not type). It is easy to check that since a higher output is worth more to
the owner than the information rent for ‘type’, the untenured contract is
preferable in this case
Finally, when ¡ ! n > s > n ¡ !; we have two cases. First, if
20qR1GL +(1 ¡ q)R1GH > (1 ¡ q)R1BL +±(1 ¡ q)R1BH
the untenured contract leads to situation identical to s > ¡ ! n where the
best possible candidate is chosen regardless of the recruitment method and
delegation is favored. The owner in this case will favor tenure. However, if
qR1GL+(1¡q)R1GH < (1¡q)R1BL+±(1¡q)R1BH
the best option in the absence of tenure is direct recuitment. The worst
available candidate is selected and there is pooling-separating equilibrium
in period 1 and the senior retains his position; the period 2 contract is fully
separating with information rents both on ‘type’ and z. With tenure, the
best available candidate is selected so that the expected period 1 output is
higher. Further, the senior continues to retain his position in period 2 under
both arrangements so that expected period 2 output under tenure is higher
as well. Finally, while the untenured contract concedes information rents to
the senior for his private observation of the period 2 realization of ‘z’, such
rents are eliminated in the tenured contract. Thus, when ¡ ! n > s > n ¡ !; the
owner would always favor delegation with tenure.{
5 Conclusion
Our study would appear to suggest that moral hazard in delegating recruit-
ment is unlikely to be a major problem in the case of large corporations
with dedicated personnel divisions, and o¤ering tenure on this grounds is
unnecessary. Small …rms, however, may be vulnerable to such moral hazard
when senior employees and line managers with multiple responsibilities are
delegated the task of recruitment. When it does occur at all o¤ering tenure
to the recruiter would usually be adequate to ensure that bad candidates are
not recruited.When the option of tenure is not common or practicable due
to various reasons one would expect a greater degree of owner participation
21in recruitment.
While we have carried out our analysis in terms of two available can-
didates, most of our analysis would go through with a larger number of
candidates. The di¤erence would be that the superiority of delegation when
the senior chooses the best available candidate (or inferiority in case he
chooses the worst available) relative to direct recruitment would tend to be-
come stronger. In other words, delegation would be more likely the larger
the number of candidates.
An useful extension to this work would be to examine the role of outside
hiring agencies in recruitment. Hiring agencies may be be able to assess
candidates reasonably well, though they are unlikely to understand the pre-
cise matching of the candidate and the job as well as the line manager. And
while they would be likely to be free from the kind of moral hazard problem
described above, their services can only be purchased at a price.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:The First Best Contract: When the type of the
candidate is perfectly observable, the problem of the owner in each period is
simply to maximize
¦t = Yt ¡ wt
subject to the condition that
Ut ¸ 0
Thus, in the …rst period, when the manager is the senior employee, or
m1 = s and the subordinate is the new candidate with perfectly observed
type: l1 = ni;i = G;B the optimal e¤ort, wages and the respective utlities











1i = s(e1 + ni) ¡ w1 = s(s
4 + ni);i = G;B
The Separating Contract (under asymmetric information): As-
sume now that only the senior employee and not the owner can observe the
‘type’ of the new candidate(s).This also means that the senior’s e¤ort cannot
be directly observed (inferred?) by the owner and hence cannot be directly
contracted on.
Suppose that the owner o¤ers a pair of separating contracts (output-
payment pairs) [^ wi; ^ Yi;i =B;G] in a static(one-period) post-recruitment
game. Now, de…ne ^ e(ni) as the e¤ort required by a senior who truthfully
reports the ‘type’ of his candidate to produce the output selected for him
by the owner, i.e.,
^ e(ni) : s(^ e(ni) + ni) = ^ Yi i = G;B
and ¶ e(nB;nG) as the e¤ort required by the senior employee with a ‘good’
recruit nG, to produce the output intended for the case where the candidate
is bad, ^ YB,
¶ e(nB;nG) : s(¶ e(nB;nG) + nG) = s(^ e(nB) + nB) = ^ YB
which implies that
¶ e(nB;nG) = ^ e(nB) ¡ nG + nB = ^ e(nB) ¡ ¢n
The optimal separating wage-e¤ort pair [^ wi;^ e(ni);i =B;G] underly-
ing such a separating contract [^ wi; ^ Yi;i =B;G] must satisfy the standard
incentive compatibility condition (for good type):
^ wG¡(^ e(nG))2 ¸ ^ wB¡(¶ e(nB;nG))2 = ^ wB¡(^ e(nB))2+2^ e(nB)¢n¡(¢n)2
along with the usual individual rationality contract (for the bad type)
^ wB ¡(^ e(nB))2 ¸ 0
25The problem of the owner in optimally selecting a pair of separating con-
tracts in this one period post recruitment game is to choose [^ wB;^ e(nB); ^ wG;^ e(nG)]
to maximize its objective function:
b ¦(¯) = ¯[s(^ e(nB) + nB) ¡ ^ wB] + (1 ¡ ¯)[s(^ e(nG) + nG) ¡ ^ wG]
subject to the two preceding constraints, where ¯ is the probability -
post recruitment - that the candidate is ‘bad’. It is fairly easy to check that
the solution to this problem is:
^ e(nG) = s


























¢n ¡ (¢n)2; ^ UB = 0
b ¦(¯) = s2






The Optimal Pooling Contract: Consider now the optimal static
pooling contract [w;Y ] that satis…es the individual rationality constraint
and hence is always accepted. If we de…ne the e¤ort of the senior employee
who has a bad candidate under such a pooling contract as e(nB), where
e(nB) : s(e(nB) + nB) = Y
then it must be true that
w ¡ (e(nB))
2 ¸ 0
Further, to produce the same amount of output the senior employee with
the ‘good’ candidate obviously puts in lower e¤ort
e(nG) = e(nB) ¡ ¢n
and produces the same output Y for the same payment w: The prob-
lem of the owner in choosing an optimal pooling contract, therefore, is to
maximize pro…ts :
¦(¯) = ¯[s(e(nB) + nB) ¡ w] +(1 ¡ ¯)[s(s(e(nB) ¡¢n + nG) ¡ w]
26when the probability of the bad type is ¯;subject to the three preceding






UG = ¢n(s ¡ ¢n);UB = 0
¦(¯) = s2
4 + snB
It is easy to check that db ¦
d¯ < 0; d¦
d¯ = 0 and b ¦(¯) > ¦(¯) {
Proof of Lemma 3:
Assume that only the senior employee and not the owner can observe
both the ’type’ of the candidate(s) as well as the realization of the periodwise
independent random parameter z in period 1. As we have already indicated,
z is observed by the senior employee after his recruitment is made.
Optimal Static Separating Contract
Assume …rst that the owner o¤ers a set of fully separating contracts
(output-payment pairs) [^ wBL; ^ YBL; ^ wBH; ^ YBH; ^ wGL;^ YGL; ^ wGH;^ YGH] in a
static(one-period) post-recruitment game. Now, de…ne ^ e(ni;zj) as the e¤ort
required by a senior who truthfully reports the ‘type’ of his candidate to
produce the output selected for him by the owner, i.e.,
^ e(ni;zj) : s(^ e(ni;zj) + ni + zj) = ^ Yij i = G;B;j = L;H
and ¶ e(nk;zl;ni;zj) as the e¤ort required by the senior employee with a
recruit ni, who has observed a realization of the random parameter zj to
produce the output intended for the case where the candidate is of type nk
and the realization of the random parameter zl, ^ Ykl.
¶ e(nk;zl;ni;zj) : s(¶ e(nk;zl;ni;zj)+ni+zj) = s(^ e(nk;zl)+nk +zl) = ^ Ykl
which implies that
¶ e(nk;zl;ni;zj) = ^ e(nk;zl) ¡ (ni ¡ nk) ¡ (zj ¡ zl)
27The optimal menu [f^ wij;^ e(ni;zj)g;i =B;G;j =L;H] underlying such a
separating mechanism [^ wij; ^ Yij;i =B;G;j =L;H] must satisfy the ‘down-
ward’incentive compatibility conditions
^ wGL ¡ (^ e(nG;zL))2 ¸ ^ wBL ¡ (¶ e(nB;zL;nG;zL))2
= ^ wBL ¡ (^ e(nB;zL))2 +2^ e(nB;zL)¢n ¡(¢n)2
^ wBH ¡ (^ e(nB;zH))2 ¸ ^ wBL ¡ (¶ e(nB;zL;nB;zH))2
= ^ wBL ¡ (^ e(nB;zL))2 +2^ e(nB;zL)¢z ¡ (¢z)2
^ wGH ¡ (^ e(nG;zH))2 ¸
maxf^ wBL ¡ (¶ e(nB;zL;nG;zH))2; ^ wGL ¡ (¶ e(nG;zL;nG;zH))2;
^ wBH ¡(¶ e(nB;zH;nG;zH))2g
along with the usual individual rationality contract (for ‘bad-low’ type)
^ wBL ¡ (^ e(nB;zL))2 ¸ 0
The problem of the owner in devising an optimal (static) separating
contract, therefore, is the one of maximizing
b b ¦(¯) = ¯[qfs(b e(nB;zL) + nB + zL) ¡ b wBLg
+(1 ¡ q)fs(b e(nB;zH) + nB +zH) ¡ b wBHg
+(1 ¡ ¯)[qfs(b e(nG;zL) + nG + zL) ¡ b wGLg
+(1¡q)fs(b e(nG;zH)+nG+zH)¡ b wGHg
where ¯ is the probability that the candidate is bad, subject to the
preceding constraints. The incentive constraints above are the downward
incentive constraints on the ‘good-low’ and ‘bad-high’ types as well as the
downward incentive constraint on the ‘good-high’ type which must ensure
that it does not mimic either of ‘bad-low’,‘good-low’ and ‘bad-high’. Re-
garding the last three it is easy to check that if either of the last two is
satis…ed then so is the …rst. Consequently, the …rst expression in constraint
[3] drops out (is not binding). Given the information rents obtainable by the
‘good-low’ and the ‘bad-high’ types, the rent obtained by the ‘good-high’
28type is given by
^ wGH ¡ (^ e(nG;zH))2 ¸
maxf^ wGL ¡ (¶ e(nG;zL;nG;zH))2; ^ wBH ¡ (¶ e(nB;zH;nG;zH))2g
= maxf2e(nB;zL)¢n+2e(nG;zL)¢z;2e(nB;zL)¢z+2e(nB;zH)¢ng
¡(¢n)2¡ (¢z)2
If the …rst term under parentheses is larger (i.e the information rents
of the ‘good-high’ type required to meet its incentive constraints with the
‘good-low’ type are higher than the one required to meet its incentive con-
straints with respect to the ‘bad-high’ type), then the third incentive con-
straint takes the form
^ wGH ¡ (^ e(nG;zH))2 ¸ 2e(nB;zL)¢n + 2e(nG;zL)¢z ¡ (¢n)2¡ (¢z)2
Solving for the optimal e¤ort levels we obtain
^ e(nG;zH) = s
2; ^ e(nB;zH) = s










Similarly, if the the information rents of the ‘good-high’ type required
to meet its incentive constraints with the ‘bad-high’ type are higher we get
^ e(nG;zH) = s
2; ^ e(nB;zH) = s
2 ¡
1¡¯
¯ ¢n; ^ e(nG;zL) = s
2;






Substituting these values into the objective function, the pro…t of the
owner can be reduced to the form:
b b ¦(¯) = s2
4 +snB +szL+
1¡q
q (¢z)+K(¯); where K(¯) > 0 and dK
d¯ < 0
Optimal Static Contract Pooling -cum- Separating Contract
Consider now the optimal static contract [wL;Y L;wH;Y H] pooling in
types but separating in the periodwise uncorrelated random parameter z.
De…ne the e¤ort of the senior employee with a candidate of type nB and a
low realization of z under such a contract as e(nB;zL), where
29e(nB;zL) : s(e(nB;zL) +nB + zL) = Y L
then it must be true that
wL ¡ (e(nB;zL))
2 ¸ 0
Further, to produce the same amount of output the senior employee with
the same low realization but a better candidate nG with obviously puts in
lower e¤ort
e(nG;zL) = e(nB;zL) ¡¢n
and produces the same output Y L for the same payment wL:
The contract is however separating in the additional parameter z
so that it involves higher output and payments for the senior employee with
the bad candidate who has observed zH . As usual this is given by
wH ¡ (e(nB;zH))
2 ¸ wL ¡ (e(nB;zL))
2 + 2(e(nB;zL))¢z ¡ ¢z2
= 2(e(nB;zL))¢z ¡ ¢z2
The senior with the good recruit but the same high realization of z is
paid the same wH but puts in lower e¤ort
e(nG;zH) = e(nB;zH) ¡ ¢n
The problem of the owner then is to maximize pro…ts :
¦(¯) = qf¯[s(e(nB;zL) + nB + zL) ¡ wL]
+(1 ¡ ¯)[s(e(nB;zL) ¡ ¢n + nG + zL) ¡ wL]g
+(1 ¡ q)f¯[s(e(nB;zH) + nB + zH) ¡ wH]
+(1¡¯)[s(e(nB;zH)¡¢n+nG +zH)¡wH]g
= q[s(e(nB;zL)+nB+zL)¡wL]+(1¡q)[s(e(nB;zH)+nB+zH)¡wH]
when the probability of the bad type is ¯;subject to the three preceding




q ¢z; e(nG;zL) = s





















4 + snB + szL +
1¡q
q (¢z)
From these it may be checked that db b ¦
d¯ < 0; d¦
d¯ = 0 and b b ¦(¯) > ¦(¯)
{
31Time Sequence For Game With Asymmetric Information Only
With Regard To Candidate Type
                
                      1. senior observes ‘n’
                       2. owner selects recruitment mode   
                          (direct/delegated) and offers period 1 contract
                       3.  senior accepts/rejects contract
                       4.  owner/senior selects candidate
                       5.   senior  selects effort
                       6. period 1 output  realized and  payments made
                       7. owner retains/downgrades senior  (only short- 
                            term contract)
                        8.  owner makes period 2 offer
                        9. period 2 manager selects effort
                      10. period 1 output  realized and   payments made
Figure 1Time Sequence For Game With Additional Asymmetric
Information 
                       1. senior observes ‘n’ and z1
                       2. owner selects recruitment mode direct/deleg
                            and offers period 1 contract
                       
                       3.  senior accepts/rejects contract
                       4.  owner/senior selects candidate
                       5.   senior  selects effort
                       6. period 1 output  realized and  payments made
                       7. owner retains/downgrades senior  (only short- 
                            term contract)
                        8.  manager observes  z2
                        9.  owner offers period 2 contract
                       10. period 2 manager selects effort
                      11. period 2 output  realized and   payments made   
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